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COMPENSATORY OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES?   
TARR V. CIASULLI BLURS THE DISTINCTION 
Timothy R. Freeman∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assigning a pecuniary value to emotional distress is inherently 
challenging because such injury is highly nebulous, hard to concep-
tualize, and difficult to accurately quantify.1  As such, judicial reluc-
tance to award damages for mental injury has been well-documented 
and is reflected in the structure of both substantive and remedial 
common law.2  Tarr v. Ciasulli,3 a recent New Jersey Supreme Court 
decision, may have opened the door to larger emotional distress 
awards in employment discrimination cases brought under New Jer-
sey’s Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD).4  Although the precise is-
sue before the Tarr court was determining the proper evidentiary 
threshold for recovery of emotional distress damages under NJLAD, 
the court suggested in dicta that victims of employment discrimina-
tion may be awarded damages for emotional distress based solely 
upon the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, as opposed to 
the degree of injury actually inflicted.5 
This Comment argues that the Tarr court’s suggestion regarding 
the scope of emotional distress damages under NJLAD is inconsistent 
with the most basic function of remedies in tort law: to make the vic-
tim whole by awarding money damages to compensate for tangible 
and intangible losses caused by the tort.6  Furthermore, the Tarr 
court’s suggestion is inconsistent with established precedent in New 
 
 ∗  J.D., 2006, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, Trinity College. 
 1 See ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES 660 (3d ed. 2002) (1989). 
 2 See id. (noting that contract claims generally do not support awards for emo-
tional distress).  Although there are a few exceptions, the general rule in tort is that 
damages for negligently-inflicted emotional distress are not awarded unless physical 
injury is present.  Id. 
 3 853 A.2d 921 (N.J. 2004). 
 4 See generally id. at 921. 
 5 See id. at 927–28. 
 6 See SHOBEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 435. 
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Jersey jurisprudence regarding NJLAD, and diverges from interpreta-
tion of the federal analogues to NJLAD, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7  Although technically only dicta, 
the Tarr court’s suggestion that emotional distress damages under 
NJLAD may be calculated by an assessment of the defendant’s con-
duct, if subsequently adopted by New Jersey courts, could lead to 
awards based on the passions of an inflamed jury, rather than on rea-
son.  Additionally, because NJLAD permits punitive damages to be 
awarded on the basis of the degree of reprehensibility of the defen-
dant’s conduct, allowing emotional distress damages to be measured 
by the same criterion could permit an unjustified recovery.8  Accord-
ingly, it was erroneous for the majority in Tarr to suggest that emo-
tional distress damages under NJLAD may be awarded based on the 
trier of fact’s assessment of the defendant’s conduct,9 as opposed to 
the degree of emotional injury actually suffered by the plaintiff and 
proven by competent evidence. 
This Comment is organized in five parts.  Part II discusses 
NJLAD and how it traditionally awards emotional distress damages, 
and briefly describes the Tarr court’s holding and troubling sugges-
tion regarding emotional distress damages.10  Part III makes the ar-
gument that, based on statutory interpretation, prior case law, and 
policy considerations, emotional distress damages under NJLAD 
should be based solely on the degree of injury inflicted and not on an 
assessment of the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.11  Part 
IV considers whether, based on the evidence of emotional injury pre-
sented in the case, the plaintiff in Tarr should be awarded emotional 
distress damages.12 
II. BACKGROUND 
The New Jersey State Legislature enacted NJLAD in 1945 for the 
purpose of eradicating “the cancer of discrimination.”13  In its current 
form, NJLAD prohibits discrimination in employment “because of 
race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, affectional or 
sexual orientation, marital status, familial status, liability for service in 
 
 7 See generally Tarr, 853 A.2d at 921. 
 8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 2004). 
 9 See Tarr, 853 A.2d at 927–28. 
 10 See infra Part II. 
 11 See infra Part III. 
 12 See infra Part IV. 
 13 Fuchilla v. Layman, 537 A.2d 652, 660 (N.J. 1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord 
Co., 253 A.2d 793, 799 (N.J. 1969)). 
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the Armed Forces of the United States, disability or nationality.”14  In 
1990, the legislature amended NJLAD to specifically authorize the re-
covery of emotional distress damages in employment discrimination 
cases.15  In addition to the stated prohibition on employment dis-
crimination, NJLAD now provides: 
 The Legislature further finds that because of discrimination, 
people suffer personal hardships, and the State suffers a grievous 
harm.  The personal hardships include: economic loss; time loss; 
physical and emotional stress; and in some cases severe emotional 
trauma, illness, homelessness or other irreparable harm resulting 
from the strain of employment controversies; relocation, search 
and moving difficulties; anxiety caused by lack of information, 
uncertainty, and resultant planning difficulty; career, education, 
family and social disruption; and adjustment problems, which 
particularly impact on those protected by this act.  Such harms 
have, under the common law, given rise to legal remedies, includ-
ing compensatory and punitive damages.  The Legislature intends 
that such damages be available to all persons protected by this act 
and that this act shall be liberally construed in combination with 
other protections available under the laws of this State.16 
While the plain language of this declaration makes clear that the leg-
islature intended to make emotional distress compensable in cases of 
employment discrimination, the severity of distress necessary to sup-
port such an award and the quantum of evidence a victim must pre-
sent in order to be compensated remained unclear.17 
In Rendine v. Pantzer,18 the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted 
to clarify the quantity and quality of evidence necessary to support an 
award of emotional distress damages under NJLAD.19  The plaintiffs 
in that case were two women who filed claims under NJLAD, alleging 
that their employment was wrongfully terminated because they be-
came pregnant.20  The claims went to a jury, which awarded damages 
 
 14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 2004). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Courts in other states have held that compensable claims of emotional distress 
must be serious by objective standards.  Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 
1970).  According to the court in Rodrigues, “serious mental distress may be found 
where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope 
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.”  Id.  If a plain-
tiff’s claim does not meet this threshold requirement, his or her claim is likely out-
side the rubric of true emotional distress.  George G. Romain, Distress Signals, 21 LOS 
ANGELES LAW. 32, 33 (Feb. 1999) (on file with author). 
 18 661 A.2d 1202 (N.J. 1995). 
 19 See generally id. at 1213–15. 
 20 See id. at 1205–07. 
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for emotional distress, as well as economic loss.21  The defendant ar-
gued that the award of emotional distress damages was excessive as a 
matter of law because neither of the plaintiffs presented expert testi-
mony or other independent corroborating testimony to support the 
awards.22  The Rendine court rejected the defendant’s argument, hold-
ing that neither expert testimony nor independent corroborating 
evidence is necessary to support an award for emotional distress un-
der NJLAD.23  Although Rendine indicated that emotional distress re-
sulting from employment discrimination is compensable under a le-
nient standard, without expert testimony or independent, objective 
corroboration, it left open the question of whether NJLAD imposes a 
threshold standard of severity for an award of emotional distress 
damages.24 
In Tarr v. Ciasulli,25 the New Jersey Supreme Court was asked to 
determine whether NJLAD imposes a threshold requirement of se-
vere emotional injury before awarding compensation for emotional 
distress.26  Tarr involved a claim of hostile work environment sexual 
harassment brought under NJLAD.27  The plaintiff worked at one of 
the defendant’s automobile dealerships for almost two years, and en-
dured an extensive barrage of sexual harassment from her male co-
workers for almost the entire duration of her employment.28  The 
plaintiff maintained that her frustration with the abusive work envi-
ronment caused her to quit, and that she suffered great emotional 
distress from the ordeal.29 
 
 21 See id. at 1213–14. 
 22 See id. at 1214. 
 23 See id.  The Rendine court upheld the Appellate Division’s conclusion that: 
     Although defendant’s discriminatory treatment did not cause plain-
tiffs to relocate or suffer illness or homelessness, both plaintiffs de-
scribed in detail their inconvenience and economic loss, physical and 
emotional stress, anxiety in searching for reemployment, uncertainty, 
career and family disruption and other adjustment problems.  Plain-
tiffs’ problems seem precisely the type for which the Legislature in-
tended compensation. 
Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1214 (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 648 A.2d 233, 244 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1994)). 
 24 See id. at 1213–15. 
 25 853 A.2d 921 (N.J. 2004). 
 26 See generally id. 
 27 See id. at 922–23. 
 28 Examples of the type of conduct to which she was subjected include: refer-
ences to women in demeaning slang, repeated sexual advances, a co-worker describ-
ing his sexual organ to her in detail, the drawing of sexually explicit pictures on 
business documents, a proposition by a co-worker to have sex in a broom closet, and 
a co-worker describing to her his various sexual escapades.  Id. at 923. 
 29 Id. 
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To support the emotional distress component of her claim, the 
plaintiff testified that she was often embarrassed by the inappropriate 
comments made by her male co-workers, and that at times she 
wanted to crawl under her desk.30  The plaintiff explained that her 
frustration with the abusive working environment led her to cry on 
the way home, and caused her to quit.31  Several co-workers corrobo-
rated her testimony regarding sexual harassment.32 
At the close of the plaintiff’s case, the trial court dismissed her 
emotional distress claim, finding that the elements of emotional dis-
tress under NJLAD are the same as for the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.33  Accordingly, the trial court posited that 
emotional distress resulting from employment discrimination is com-
pensable only if severe enough to cause “discrete physical symptoms 
of illness or diagnosable psychological sequelae.”34  The appellate 
court reversed, finding that emotional distress under NJLAD was in-
tended to be compensated under a more generous standard.35  Ac-
cording to the appellate court, emotional distress under NJLAD is 
compensable even if not severe or substantial, and if the only evi-
dence presented is the plaintiff’s own testimony.36 
The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s rul-
ing, finding that NJLAD permits a lower evidentiary threshold for the 
recovery of emotional distress damages than is necessary under the 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.37   Justice Wallace, 
writing for the majority, asserted that the New Jersey State Legislature 
amended NJLAD in 1990 in order to authorize recovery for emo-
tional harm in employment discrimination claims, and intended the 
amended provisions to be broadly construed.38  He noted the physi-
cal, emotional, and economic hardships that employment discrimina-
tion has been known to produce, and acknowledged that the prece-
dent of Rendine v. Pantzer39 indicates that expert testimony and 
independent corroborative evidence are unnecessary for one to re-
 
 30 Id. 
 31 Tarr, 853 A.2d at 923. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 822 A.2d 647, 650 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2003). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. at 653–54. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Tarr, 853 A.2d at 928. 
 38 Id. at 925. 
 39 661 A.2d 1202 (N.J. 1995). 
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cover for emotional distress in such cases.40  Analogizing NJLAD to Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Justice Wallace bolstered his 
analysis by alluding to federal case law41 in which the courts have held 
that damages for emotional distress can be recovered under Title VII 
without a finding of severe emotional distress and without independ-
ent corroborative evidence or expert testimony.42 
In addition to holding that severe distress is not necessary for an 
award of emotional distress damages in cases of employment dis-
crimination,43 Justice Wallace went a step further.  He suggested that 
in the case before him, the reprehensibility of the defendant’s con-
duct, standing alone, warranted an emotional distress award.44  Spe-
cifically, he quoted the following passage from the Appellate Divi-
sion’s opinion: 
To suffer humiliation, embarrassment and indignity is by defini-
tion to suffer emotional distress. . . . The quantum of compensa-
tion . . . is dependent upon the relevant factors we have identified 
including duration of discriminatory conduct, its public nature, 
and its content and may be enhanced by such additional proofs of 
indicia of suffering as plaintiff may adduce.  We add only that the 
duration and the content of the conduct asserted here clearly, in 
our view, warrants an award in some amount.45 
III. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES AND  
REPREHENSIBILITY OF THE DEFENDANT’S CONDUCT 
The Tarr court’s suggestion that a fact-finder may award dam-
ages for emotional distress based on the reprehensibility of the de-
fendant’s conduct likely stems from the nature of the legal violation 
at issue in that case.  The plaintiff in Tarr established the defendant’s 
liability for a hostile work environment under NJLAD, which requires 
a female plaintiff to prove that the complained-of conduct “would not 
have occurred but for the employee’s gender; and it was . . . severe or 
 
 40 See id. at 1213–15. 
 41 For example, Justice Wallace cited the cases of Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 
F.3d 1041, 1045–46 (5th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Norwest Fin. Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 
1408, 1413 (10th Cir. 1997); Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1065 (8th Cir. 
1997); and Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996).  Tarr, 
853 A.2d at 926. 
 42 See Tarr, 853 A.2d at 926.  However, legal scholars have posited that plaintiffs 
suffering from significant emotional distress should be expected to display some 
functional limitation in their day-to-day life.  Romain, supra note 17, at 36. 
 43 Tarr, 853 A.2d at 927. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. (quoting Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 822 A.2d 647, 653–54 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003)). 
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pervasive enough to make a . . . reasonable woman believe that the 
conditions of employment are altered and the working environment 
is hostile or abusive.”46  The Tarr court likely assumed that some de-
gree of compensable emotional distress is necessarily concomitant to 
a viable hostile work environment claim under this framework. 
Nonetheless, this suggestion is contrary to relevant case law and 
problematic from a policy perspective.  Unlike federal hostile work 
environment law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, hos-
tile work environment claims under NJLAD do not require the plain-
tiff to subjectively perceive the complained-of conduct as hostile or 
abusive.47  The New Jersey Supreme Court has indicated that, 
“[u]nder our objective standard . . . a plaintiff would state a claim 
even if she personally did not experience the workplace as hostile or 
intimidating.”48  Because a plaintiff can establish a viable hostile work 
environment claim under NJLAD without subjectively perceiving the 
work environment as hostile or abusive, it is erroneous to presume 
that he or she suffered emotional harm.  Moreover, the Tarr court’s 
suggestion is contrary to prior New Jersey and federal case law and 
dangerous from a policy perspective. 
A. The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination 
There is nothing in the language of NJLAD that suggests that 
emotional distress damages may be awarded based on the defen-
dant’s conduct.49  The New Jersey Legislature enacted NJLAD because 
it recognized the inherent evil in discrimination, and all of the perni-
cious effects flowing therefrom.50  NJLAD states that “discrimination 
threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants 
of the State but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free 
democratic State.”51  After specifically mentioning emotional distress 
as one of the harms that may flow from discrimination, NJLAD states 
that compensatory and punitive damages are available remedies.52 
The language in NJLAD mentions only common law remedies, 
including compensatory and punitive damages, as possible awards for 
 
 46 Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 453–54 (N.J. 1993). 
 47 Id. at 458–59. 
 48 Id. at 458. 
 49 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 2004). 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
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victims of discrimination.53  Nowhere in the text of NJLAD does it 
state or imply that compensation for emotional injury resulting from 
employment discrimination may be awarded pursuant to an assess-
ment of the defendant’s conduct alone.54 
Under common law, compensatory damages were designed to 
place the plaintiff in the position he or she would have occupied had 
the loss or detriment never occurred.55  The amount of money 
awarded should be equivalent to the loss or detriment, so as to nei-
ther improve nor subtract from the position of the plaintiff prior to 
the wrong.56  In the context of emotional distress damages under 
NJLAD, compensatory damages should provide the plaintiff with a 
monetary sum equivalent to the emotional injury incurred, in order 
to make him or her whole.57  Although the inherently nebulous na-
ture of emotional distress makes it difficult to precisely quantify in 
monetary terms, the basic premise of compensatory damages cannot 
be reconciled with the idea of basing such awards upon the severity of 
the defendant’s conduct, as opposed to the plaintiff’s injury.58 
B. New Jersey Precedent 
New Jersey case law on emotional distress damages under 
NJLAD is devoid of any suggestion that such damages may be 
awarded in proportion to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct.  In her dissenting opinion in Tarr, Justice LaVecchia as-
serted that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s analysis of emotional dis-
tress damages under NJLAD in Taylor v. Metzger59 should be control-
ling.60  In Taylor, the plaintiff brought a hostile work environment 
claim under NJLAD after her supervisor directed a racist comment 
 
 53 After listing specific harms that employment discrimination has been known to 
cause, the text of the NJLAD indicates that: 
[s]uch harms have, under the common law, given rise to legal reme-
dies, including compensatory and punitive damages.  The Legislature 
intends that such damages be available to all persons protected by this 
act and that this act shall be liberally construed in combination with 
other protections available under the laws of this State. 
Id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 17 (1999). 
 56 Id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
 59 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998). 
 60 Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 931 (N.J. 2004) (LaVecchia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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toward her.61  The plaintiff sought redress for the emotional injury 
that she suffered as a result of the remark under both NJLAD and 
under the common law action of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.62  Interestingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court analyzed the 
emotional distress component of the plaintiff’s claim under the 
framework of the common law tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.63  Nonetheless, nowhere in its opinion did the Taylor 
court suggest or imply that emotional distress damages in employ-
ment discrimination cases may be measured by the degree of repre-
hensibility of the defendant’s conduct.64 
In her dissenting opinion in Tarr, Justice LaVecchia maintained 
that the Taylor court did not alter the basic premise that only emo-
tional injury reasonably proven is compensable under NJLAD.65  In 
Justice LaVecchia’s view, the majority’s opinion in Tarr completely 
disregards the Taylor decision, despite the fact that it was rendered 
after the 1990 amendments to NJLAD.66 
In addition, Justice LaVecchia alluded to the trial court’s opin-
ion in Tarr, which indicated that in order to recover for emotional 
distress resulting from employment discrimination, plaintiffs need to 
prove that they suffered from more than a temporary upset; they 
need to show substantial injury.67 According to the trial court, com-
pensatory damages are intended to make victims whole, not to punish 
litigants for wrongdoing.68  Justice LaVecchia’s citation of this portion 
of the trial court’s opinion suggests that she believed that plaintiffs 
seeking emotional distress damages in actions brought under NJLAD 
must present substantial evidence of their emotional injury, and 
should only be compensated to the extent that they are actually 
 
 61 The plaintiff’s supervisor called her a “jungle bunny.”  Taylor, 706 A.2d at 687. 
 62 Id. at 688. 
 63 See id. at 687. 
 64 See generally id.  
 65 See Tarr, 853 A.2d at 931–32 (LaVecchia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 66 Id. at 932. 
 67 Id. at 933. 
 68 Id. at 934.  “There is universal agreement that the compensatory goal of tort 
law requires making the successful plaintiff ‘whole,’ a reasonably precise objective.”  
Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Public Policy: Valuing Life 
and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 909–10 
(1989).  Substantive law attempts to achieve this goal by compensating the victim for 
economic expense and nonpecuniary loss.  Id. at 910.  While substantive law provides 
only general, qualitative guidelines for determining the size of emotional distress 
awards, it has never been suggested that such awards should be measured by the 
conduct of the defendant.  See id. 
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harmed.69  While Justice LaVecchia recognized that plaintiffs seeking 
emotional distress damages in claims brought under NJLAD do not 
necessarily need to present expert testimony, she maintained that 
they do need to prove causation and show evidence of emotional 
harm before compensation can be awarded.70 
New Jersey Supreme Court opinions have never deviated from 
the principle that emotional distress damages are to be awarded 
solely to compensate for emotional injury actually inflicted upon the 
plaintiff and reasonably proven.71  In Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.,72 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that a plaintiff need not show serious 
psychological harm in order to establish a viable claim for hostile 
work environment sexual harassment under NJLAD.73  However, the 
Lehmann court explicitly stated that, “if a plaintiff suffers psychologi-
cal harm and wishes to collect damages for that injury, she must show 
that she suffered psychological harm and to what extent.”74  The Leh-
mann court recognized the remedial nature of the NJLAD and that 
serious psychological injury is not necessary to establish a viable 
claim.75  However, the Lehmann court maintained that emotional dis-
tress should only be compensated to the extent that it can be proven 
by competent evidence.76  The Tarr court undermines this precedent 
by suggesting that damages for psychological injury may be measured 
by the trier of fact’s impression of the egregiousness of the defen-
dant’s conduct.77 
C. Federal Case Law 
To supplement the legislative history of NJLAD, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has often looked to federal precedent governing Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a “key source of interpretive 
authority.”78  Substantive and procedural standards of NJLAD have 
been “markedly influenced by the federal experience.”79  Further-
 
 69 See Tarr, 853 A.2d at 934 (LaVecchia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 70 Id. at 934–35. 
 71 See generally Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998); Rendine v. Pantzer, 
661 A.2d 1202 (N.J. 1995). 
 72 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993). 
 73 Id. at 455–56. 
 74 Id. at 457. 
 75 See id. at 456. 
 76 Id. at 457. 
 77 See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 927–28 (N.J. 2004). 
 78 Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 906 (N.J. 1990). 
 79 Id. at 906–07. 
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more, the procedural and substantive standards of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
have been used somewhat interchangeably with those of Title VII, as 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a civil cause of action for people who have 
been denied their constitutional or federal statutory rights.80  Thus, 
both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
serve as important sources for the interpretation of NJLAD, which 
codifies many of the same protections provided under the aforemen-
tioned federal statutes.81 
In Carey v. Piphus,82 the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined when and to what extent  emotional distress damages may be 
awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.83  Carey involved several high school 
students who were caught smoking what was believed to be mari-
juana.84  The students were immediately suspended from school with-
out a hearing or an explanation for the suspension, despite their con-
tention that they were actually smoking ordinary cigarettes.85  After 
obtaining representation from a legal aid clinic, the plaintiffs filed 
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging that the summary suspension 
violated their right to due process of law guaranteed in the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.86 
The trial court held that the students had been suspended with-
out procedural due process, but declined to award damages because 
they presented no evidence to quantify their damages.87  On appeal, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, 
even if the plaintiffs’ suspensions were justified, they were entitled to 
recover substantial “non punitive” damages for the distress they en-
dured in being denied procedural due process.88  The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether, in an action 
under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that he was actually injured by 
the denial of procedural due process before he is entitled to recover 
substantial “non punitive” damages.89 
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held 
that, without proof of actual injury, the students were entitled to re-
 
 80 See Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 81 See Grigoletti, 570 A.2d at 912. 
 82 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
 83 See generally id. 
 84 Id. at 249. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 249–50. 
 87 Id. at 251–52. 
 88 See Carey, 435 U.S. at 252–53. 
 89 Id. at 253. 
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cover only nominal damages.90  Justice Powell, writing the opinion of 
the Court, endorsed the idea that “the cardinal principle of damages 
in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the injury caused 
to plaintiff by defendant’s breach of duty.”91  According to Justice 
Powell, the Court has always maintained that damages are available 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only “for actions ‘found . . . to have been vio-
lative of . . . constitutional rights and to have caused compensable in-
jury.’”92  Based on the applicable precedent in this area of law, Justice 
Powell concluded that damages under § 1983 should be awarded 
pursuant to the compensation principle.93 
Regarding the emotional distress component of the § 1983 ac-
tion, Justice Powell posited that “distress is a personal injury familiar 
to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature and circum-
stances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff.”94  With respect to 
emotional injury caused by the denial of due process, Justice Powell 
reasoned that, “[a]lthough essentially subjective, genuine injury in 
this respect may be evidenced by one’s conduct and observed by oth-
ers.”95  Justice Powell asserted that: 
although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of 
procedural due process itself is compensable under § 1983, we 
hold that neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of 
proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages 
without proof that such injury actually was caused.96 
Although the Carey Court decided the appropriate compensation for 
emotional distress caused by the deprivation of federal and constitu-
tional rights, as opposed to employment discrimination under 
NJLAD, its holding is irreconcilable with the premise that emotional 
distress damages may be measured by the degree of reprehensibility 
of the defendant’s conduct.  Because the plaintiffs in Carey were not 
permitted to recover for emotional distress due to their failure to 
show actual injury,97 it seems incongruous to award compensatory 
damages under NJLAD based on the defendant’s conduct, without 
regard to the plaintiff’s actual injury. 
 
 90 Id. at 248. 
 91 See id. at 255 (citing F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 1299 (1956)). 
 92 Id. (citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975)). 
 93 See id. 
 94 Carey, 435 U.S. at 263–64. 
 95 Id. at 264. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See id. 
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In Memphis Community School District v. Stachura,98 the United 
States Supreme Court clarified and expanded upon the ruling in 
Carey.99  Stachura involved a tenured public school teacher in Mem-
phis, Michigan who taught seventh-grade life science.100  The course 
he taught included a unit on human reproduction, during which he 
showed the class pictures of his wife during her pregnancy and two 
approved films concerning human growth and sexuality.101  After sev-
eral parents complained at an open school board meeting, he was 
summarily suspended with pay.102  The teacher subsequently filed suit 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking compensatory and punitive damages 
for the deprivation of both liberty and property without due process 
of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and for infringe-
ment upon his First Amendment right to academic freedom.103 
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell reiterated the principle, es-
tablished in Carey, that the appropriate measure of damages for the 
deprivation of constitutional rights under § 1983 is to be derived 
from the common law of torts.104  Justice Powell maintained that 
damages in tort cases have historically been designed to provide 
compensation for physical and emotional injury caused by the defen-
dant’s breach of duty.105  Thus, where no emotional injury is present, 
no compensatory damages may be awarded.106 
Importantly, Justice Powell declared that the jury instruction, 
which allowed emotional distress damages to be awarded pursuant to 
the jury’s subjective determination of “the importance of constitu-
tional rights as an abstract matter,”107 is impermissible under Carey.108  
According to Justice Powell, “Carey . . . makes clear that the abstract 
value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 1983 dam-
ages.”109  Justice Powell dismissed the argument that the Carey ruling 
was inapplicable when dealing with deprivations of substantive (as 
opposed to procedural) constitutional rights, claiming that Carey did 
not “establish a two-tiered system of constitutional rights, with sub-
 
 98 477 U.S. 299 (1986). 
 99 See generally id. 
 100 Id. at 300. 
 101 Id. at 300–01. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. at 301–02. 
 104 Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306. 
 105 Id. at 306–07. 
 106 See id. at 308. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
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stantive rights afforded greater protection than ‘mere’ procedural 
safeguards.”110  On the contrary, Justice Powell reasoned that, regard-
less of the basis for § 1983 liability, damages should be awarded solely 
to compensate for actual injury caused by infringement upon consti-
tutional rights.111 
Furthermore, Justice Powell maintained that damages based on 
the abstract “value” of constitutional rights are inherently nebulous 
and difficult to quantify, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious ap-
plication of justice.112  Justice Powell asserted that, “were such dam-
ages available, juries would be free to award arbitrary amounts with-
out any evidentiary basis, or to use their unbounded discretion to 
punish unpopular defendants.”113 
Although the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in both 
Carey and Stachura is not binding on the New Jersey Supreme Court 
for purposes of interpreting NJLAD, both of the aforementioned 
cases stand for the proposition that emotional distress should only be 
compensated to an extent commensurate with the proof of actual in-
jury that the plaintiff presents.114  This principle is in direct conflict 
with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s suggestion in Tarr that emo-
tional distress damages in employment discrimination cases may be 
measured by the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, rather 
than the extent of the plaintiff’s proven injury.115  The Tarr court’s 
suggestion is problematic because, by allowing emotional distress 
damages to be measured by the severity of the defendant’s conduct, it 
ignores the concern expressed by Justice Powell in Stachura: that ju-
ries will have unbridled discretion to punish unpopular defendants 
by coloring compensatory damages with punitive considerations.116  
Furthermore, because the Tarr court’s suggestion permits compensa-
tion for emotional distress resulting from employment discrimination 
to deviate from an amount proportionate to the actual injury in-
 
 110 Stachura, 477 U.S. at 309. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. at 310. 
 113 Id.  Many legal scholars have argued that broad jury discretion and the absence 
of clear standards have resulted in disproportionately large awards.  Bovbjerg, Sloan 
& Blumstein, supra note 68, at 917.  According to Bovbjerg, Sloan and Blumstein, “it 
is frequently argued that the civil liability system is out of control, compensating 
claims far too generously.”  Id.  More and more, plaintiffs and their contingency fee 
lawyers try to hold out for “jackpot” recoveries while even the slightest chance of an 
enormous verdict may force defendants to settle non-meritorious claims.  Id. 
 114 See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 309; Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978). 
 115 Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 927–28 (N.J. 2004). 
 116 See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310. 
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flicted, it increases the chances that employment discrimination vic-
tims will receive an unjustified award. 
D. Policy Considerations 
There are two main reasons why the Tarr court’s suggestion that 
emotional distress damages may be awarded pursuant to a subjective 
assessment of the defendant’s conduct is problematic from a public 
policy standpoint.  First, because NJLAD already permits punitive 
damages to be determined in part by the repugnancy of the defen-
dant’s conduct, allowing emotional distress damages to be measured 
by the same criterion could permit the defendant to be punished 
twice for the same wrong.  In addition, allowing the jury to determine 
compensatory damages for emotional distress based on their assess-
ment of the defendant’s conduct could open the door to unjustified 
awards based more on juror passion than reason. 
i. Punishing Twice for the Same Wrong 
Because punitive damages under NJLAD are based in part on 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, permitting compen-
satory damages for emotional distress to be based on the same crite-
rion permits the defendant to be punished twice for the same wrong.  
In Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.117 the New Jersey Supreme Court held 
that there are two preconditions for an award of punitive damages 
under NJLAD: (1) upper management must have actually partici-
pated in the discriminatory conduct or shown willful indifference to-
wards it and (2) the conduct complained of must have been “espe-
cially egregious.”118  In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
indicated that courts reviewing punitive damage awards under 
NJLAD must employ the substantive standards established in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore119 to ensure that such an award bears some 
“reasonable relation” to the injury inflicted.120  In BMW, the United 
States Supreme Court articulated three factors to be weighed when 
determining whether a punitive damage award is so large as to violate 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) the de-
gree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the disparity 
between the harm or potential harm suffered and the size of the 
award; and (3) the difference between the award given and those in 
 
 117 626 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1993). 
 118 See id. at 464–65. 
 119 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 120 Baker v. Nat’l State Bank, 736 A.2d 462, 468 (N.J. 1999). 
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comparable cases.121  The BMW Court maintained that the “most im-
portant indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award 
is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.”122 
Because punitive damage awards under NJLAD are based in part 
on the “egregiousness” of the defendant’s conduct123 and are re-
viewed for reasonableness according to a standard that takes into ac-
count the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct,124 allowing 
compensatory damages for emotional distress to be based on the 
same criterion permits the defendant to be punished twice for the 
same wrong.125   The Tarr court’s suggestion that emotional distress 
damages under NJLAD should be assessed according to the “dura-
tion,” “nature,” and “content” of the defendant’s conduct126 is analo-
gous to assessing the “egregiousness” and “reprehensibility” of the de-
fendant’s conduct in the award of punitive damages.  The 
coexistence of these two standards blurs the distinction between 
compensatory and punitive damages, potentially permitting the 
plaintiff to receive an unjustified award. 
ii. Encouraging Awards Based on Passion 
The Tarr court’s suggestion that emotional distress damages un-
der NJLAD may be determined by an assessment of the reprehensibil-
ity of the defendant’s conduct may lead to unreasonably large awards 
based on enflamed juror passions, rather than reason.  Scholars have 
suggested that punitive damages have “turn[ed] the civil justice sys-
tem into a slot machine, paying off in jackpots for those who hit the 
right, randomly selected combination.”127  In Herman v. Sunshine 
Chemical Specialties, Inc.128  Justice Pollock of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court reasoned that: 
[A]t the core of punitive damages lurks a volatile dilemma: the 
same findings necessary for the award of punitive damages can in-
cite a jury to act irrationally.  A condition precedent to a punitive-
 
 121 See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 464–65. 
 124 BMW, 517 U.S. at 575. 
 125 Jill McKee Pohlman, Comment, Punitive Damages in the American Civil Justice Sys-
tem: Jackpot or Justice?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 613, 658.  “Multiple punitive damages 
awards are inherently unfair. If the purpose behind punitive damages is truly to deter 
and to punish the defendant, then one punitive damages award should sufficiently 
serve those purposes and additional awards are unnecessary.”  Id. 
 126 Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 927 (N.J. 2004). 
 127 Mark Pennington, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A Core Sample from the 
Decisions of the Last Ten Years, 42 ARK. L. REV. 31, 100 (1989). 
 128 627 A.2d 1081 (N.J. 1993). 
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damages award is the finding that the defendant is guilty of actual 
malice.  The purposes of the award—the deterrence of egregious 
misconduct and the punishment of the offender—when mixed 
with a finding that the defendant is malicious, can readily inflame 
an otherwise-dispassionate jury.129 
With substantive limits on punitive damages often only vaguely de-
fined, critics argue that juries have been able to impose upon defen-
dants unlimited awards, which lack any correlation to the compensa-
tory damages designed to make the plaintiff whole.130 
Justice O’Connor argued in her dissenting opinion in Pacific Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,131 that punitive damage awards in the 
United States are often excessive due to the lack of clear guidance 
that juries are given when determining them.132  In Haslip, the United 
States Supreme Court considered whether an $840,000 punitive 
damage award for insurance fraud that led to a compensable loss of 
$200,000 was so excessive as to violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.133  The Court held that the punitive damage 
award in that case did not violate the Due Process Clause because 
Alabama law provided adequate procedural protections to keep the 
award within the bounds of rationality, and an award of that size was 
justified in order to deter other insurers from committing the same 
malicious fraud.134 
Fundamentally disagreeing with the Court’s analysis, Justice 
O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in which she argued that the 
punitive damage award in Haslip violated the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it was highly excessive in rela-
tion to the harm inflicted, and based on extremely vague jury instruc-
tions.135  Justice O’Connor postulated that many states routinely au-
 
 129 Id. at 1085. 
 130 Pohlman, supra note 125, at 624.  The most egregious example of this may be 
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, where the jury awarded a wealthy doctor $4 mil-
lion in punitive damages because his new BMW had been scratched, and was then 
painted over and sold to him as new.  See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 563–65 (1996). 
 131 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 132 Id. at 35–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 133 Id. at 4–7 (majority opinion).  The plaintiff in this case, an employee of an Ala-
bama municipality, was defrauded by an agent of Pacific Mutual Insurance Company, 
who misappropriated the plaintiff’s insurance premiums.  Id. at 4–5. 
 134 See id. at 20–23.  The Alabama Supreme Court has post-trial procedures for 
scrutinizing punitive damage awards: it undertakes a comparative analysis of other 
punitive damage awards for like conduct, and substantively reviews the award to en-
sure that it does not exceed an amount necessary to accomplish the social goals of 
deterrence and retribution.  Id. at 20–21. 
 135 See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 35–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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thorize juries to award punitive damages without giving them any 
meaningful guidance as to how to do so.136  According to Justice 
O’Connor, this can permit juries to “target unpopular defendants, 
penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and redistribute 
wealth.”137  Far too often, in Justice O’Connor’s view, courts basically 
instruct the jury to “[t]hink about how much you hate what the de-
fendants did and teach them a lesson.”138 
Part of the problem with punitive damages is that while compen-
satory damages are tied to an actual injury, punitive damages have no 
objective boundary.139  The Tarr court’s suggestion that compensatory 
damages for emotional distress under NJLAD may be ascertained 
based on the “duration,” “nature” and “content” of the defendant’s 
conduct140 eviscerates this distinction, rendering compensatory awards 
exposed to all the inherent flaws and dangers of punitive damages.  
The Tarr court’s blanket assertion that “[n]o reasonable woman can 
be expected to have endured the constant and prolonged barrage of 
the extraordinarily demeaning and degrading sexual harassment to 
which this plaintiff was subjected without humiliation, embarrass-
ment and loss of personal dignity”141 does not give the jury any rea-
sonable guidance upon which to fashion an award.142  The Tarr court 
suggests that the defendant’s conduct was repugnant enough to war-
rant an award of some size,143 but does not attempt to provide any 
guidance as to how to arrive at a just determination of damages.  
Such vagueness sets the stage for wildly large and varying awards, 
bearing little connection with the emotional distress actually in-
flicted.144  Because the aim of compensatory damages is to compen-
 
 136 Id. at 37.  The jury in Haslip was instructed by the trial court that “should you 
award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take into consideration the 
character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and the necessity of 
preventing a similar wrong.”  Id. at 48.  Such a vague instruction invites jurors to rely 
on emotion, bias and prejudice rather than reason.  See id. 
 137 Id. at 43. 
 138 Id. at 49. 
 139 See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 54 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 140 Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 927 (N.J. 2004). 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Romain, supra note 17, at 36.  Lack of objective guidelines from which ju-
ries can measure plaintiffs’ emotional distress can lead to vast discrepancies in dam-
age awards for seemingly similar injuries.  Id.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers often use allegations 
of emotional distress as part of impassioned closing arguments for damages well 
above a victim’s fairly ascertainable compensatory damages.  See id. at 33. 
 143 Tarr, 853 A.2d at 927. 
 144 “[W]orkplace harassment claims, and other cases involving egregious conduct 
by the defendant should be carefully scrutinized by defense counsel because these 
types of cases are more likely to incite a jury to give the plaintiff greater compensa-
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sate the victim for harm inflicted, presuming harm from reprehensi-
ble conduct opens the door to excessively high awards based on the 
vindictive or sympathetic passions of juries. 
IV. EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES IN TARR 
The plaintiff in Tarr may not be entitled to emotional distress 
damages on remand if the trier of fact is only permitted to consider 
the evidence of emotional injury that was presented at trial.  During 
the trial portion of Tarr v. Ciasulli, there was considerable testimony 
describing a hostile and discriminatory working environment at the 
defendant’s place of business.145  However, the plaintiff’s testimony 
regarding her resulting emotional injury was not extensive: she testi-
fied as to her acute embarrassment and humiliation, and indicated 
that comments made to her in the presence of others made her turn 
“beet red” and “want to crawl under [her] desk.”146  The plaintiff also 
testified that she would on occasion cry “all the way home from being 
frustrated, from being intimidated . . . .”147   Although a co-worker tes-
tified as to her impression of how the discrimination had affected the 
plaintiff, the “plaintiff herself introduced no other evidence of her 
emotional distress.”148 
The plaintiff’s testimony in Tarr may not be enough to support 
an award of damages for emotional distress.  Even though New Jersey 
case law clearly indicates that independent corroborating evidence of 
emotional distress is not necessary149 and that emotional distress need 
not be “severe” in order for the victim to recover,150 courts have dis-
missed claims for emotional distress when the testimony regarding 
emotional injury is vague and conclusory.  For example, in Spragg v. 
Shore Care and Shore Memorial Hospital,151 the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, Appellate Division, held that an award of $42,500 for emo-
tional distress resulting from employment discrimination amounted 
to a miscarriage of justice because the plaintiff presented insufficient 
evidence of emotional harm.152  In Spragg, the plaintiff was a male 
home healthcare aide who filed a claim under NJLAD, alleging that 
 
tion for emotional injuries—even without expert testimony.”  Romain, supra note 17, 
at 57. 
 145 Tarr, 853 A.2d at 932. 
 146 Id. at 933. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 939. 
 149 Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1214–15 (N.J. 1995). 
 150 Tarr, 853 A.2d at 928. 
 151 679 A.2d 685 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). 
 152 See id. at 699–700. 
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he was a victim of sex discrimination due to a policy whereby male 
aides could only care for male patients, “whereas female aides were 
allowed to care for patients of both genders.”153 
The court in Spragg held that there must be a substantial basis in 
the record for an award of emotional distress damages under NJLAD, 
and that the evidence presented by the plaintiff was “extremely thin, 
if not superficial, regarding the emotional suffering he endured as a 
result of defendant’s policy, as were his proofs regarding the disrup-
tion to his life following the loss of his job.”154  While the court ac-
knowledged that NJLAD authorizes recovery for emotional distress 
resulting from “economic loss, homelessness, relocation, and disrup-
tion to one’s career, education, family, and social life” caused by em-
ployment discrimination, it determined that none of these hardships 
were proven in the case before it.155  The plaintiff was only out of work 
for three months, his “career” in the healthcare field lasted only nine 
months, he had comparable income available from other employ-
ment opportunities, had no family to support, and his greatest loss 
during three months of unemployment was having to trade in one 
old car for another.156  While recognizing that there is no precise way 
to measure mental suffering, the court held that an award of $42,500 
for the plaintiff’s emotional distress, in light of the evidence pre-
sented, was “so excessive as to represent a miscarriage of justice.”157 
Similarly, in Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp.,158 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “hurt 
feelings, anger and frustration are part of life,” and held that the 
plaintiff in that case had not presented enough evidence to sustain a 
claim for emotional distress under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.159  The plaintiff in Patterson claimed that she experienced sig-
nificant emotional distress when her employer allegedly fired her for 
hiring a black employee.160  While she testified as to her mental an-
guish during the period of unemployment that ensued and to the re-
sulting family turmoil that followed, she presented no other signifi-
 
 153 Id. at 687. 
 154 Id. at 699. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. at 699–700. Although the plaintiff had some trouble paying his bills during 
his period of unemployment, he had been in debt and unemployed before he ever 
started working for Shore Care.  Spragg, 679 A.2d at 699–700. 
 157 Id. at 700. 
 158 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 159 Id. at 940. 
 160 Id. 
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cant evidence.161  The Fifth Circuit found that, based on the evidence 
presented, the plaintiff was entitled to no more than nominal dam-
ages for her emotional distress.162 
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of emotional distress dam-
ages again in Brady v. Fort Bend County.163  In Brady, the plaintiffs were 
police officers who worked under a Republican Sheriff who lost a bid 
for re-election to a Democrat.164  The plaintiffs, who had openly sup-
ported their former boss in his campaign for re-election, were subse-
quently not rehired by Fort Bend County.165  They claimed that they 
were discriminated against based upon the exercise of their First 
Amendment rights of free speech and association.166 
The plaintiffs testified that, as a result of the discrimination that 
they endured, they were “highly upset,” spent too much time on the 
couch, and could not “accept it mentally.”167  The Fifth Circuit held 
that the plaintiffs’ testimony was “too vague and conclusory” to sup-
port emotional distress damages.168  Furthermore, when the plaintiffs 
did describe specific manifestations of their emotional distress—such 
as nervousness and sleeplessness—they did not provide sufficient de-
 
 161 Id. at 940–41.  Although the plaintiff testified that the period of unemployment 
that followed her termination required her to relocate and live apart from her chil-
dren, she presented no corroborating testimony, no medical or psychological evi-
dence, and no evidence demonstrating the nature and extent of the emotional harm 
that she allegedly suffered.  Id. at 941. 
 162 Id. at 941. 
 163 145 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 164 See id. at 697. 
 165 See id. 
 166 See id. 
 167 Id. at 719. 
 168 Id.  The Fifth Circuit looked for guidance from an Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) official guidance statement: 
Emotional harm will not be presumed simply because the complaining 
party is a victim of discrimination.  The existence, nature, and severity 
of emotional harm must be proved.  Emotional harm may manifest it-
self, for example, as sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital 
strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self esteem, excessive fa-
tigue, or a nervous breakdown.  Physical manifestations of emotional 
harm may consist of ulcers, gastrointestinal disorders, hair loss, or 
headaches. 
. . . . 
     The Commission will typically require medical evidence of emo-
tional harm to seek damages for such harm in conciliation negotia-
tions. 
EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE NO. 915.002 § II(A)(2) (July 14, 1992), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/damages.html. 
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tail.169  According to the Fifth Circuit, such “failure of proof is unac-
ceptable” and legally deficient for a claim of emotional distress.170 
Similarly, in Price v. City of Charlotte,171 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ claims for 
emotional distress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were not buttressed with 
sufficient evidence to support an award of damages.172  Price involved a 
reverse-discrimination charge brought by several white police officers 
who claimed that they suffered emotional distress by being subjected 
to a city policy that used race as a positive factor in promoting mi-
norities, at their expense.173  The only evidence that the plaintiffs in 
that case presented of their emotional distress was their testimony 
that they felt “betrayed,” “embarrassed,” and “degraded.”174  Holding 
that the plaintiffs had not presented enough evidence to support a 
compensatory award for emotional distress, the Fourth Circuit rea-
soned that it must be established that the plaintiffs “suffered demon-
strable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated; nei-
ther conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional 
distress nor the mere fact that a constitutional violation occurred sup-
ports an award of compensatory damages.”175  The Fourth Circuit 
stressed the need to show “genuine injury” before emotional distress 
can be compensable.176 
The evidence presented by the plaintiff in Tarr, consisting pri-
marily of testimony that she felt “bothered” and cried while driving 
home on one occasion, is not significantly different from that in Pat-
terson, Price, Brady, or Spragg, where claims for emotional distress were 
denied.177  Accordingly, if the New Jersey Supreme Court were strictly 
limited to an assessment of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, 
excluding its determination that “the duration and content of the 
conduct asserted here clearly . . . warrants an award in some 
 
 169 Brady, 145 F.3d at 719.  The plaintiffs made statements indicating that their 
termination “caused marital problems” and that “there were sleepless nights,” but 
did not go into any further detail.  Id. 
 170 Id. at 719–20. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit conceded that “[w]hen a 
plaintiff’s testimony is particularized and extensive, such that it speaks to the nature, 
extent, and duration of the claimed emotional harm in a manner that portrays a spe-
cific and discernable injury, then that testimony alone may be sufficient.”  Id. at 720. 
 171 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 172 Id. at 1254. 
 173 Id. at 1243. 
 174 Id. at 1255. 
 175 Id. at 1254. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 940 (N.J. 2004). 
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amount,”178 the plaintiff may not have been entitled to an amount 
greater than nominal damages for her emotional distress.  Accord-
ingly, unless she presents more specific testimony as to the harm that 
she suffered, the plaintiff should not receive emotional distress dam-
ages as a matter of law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Tarr v. Ciasulli,179 suggested 
that the quantum of compensation for emotional distress suffered by 
victims of employment discrimination may be determined by the trier 
of fact’s assessment of the content, duration, and degree of repre-
hensibility of the defendant’s conduct, in addition to proof of emo-
tional injury presented by the plaintiff.180  This suggestion is contrary 
to established precedent under NJLAD and inconsistent with the case 
law of its federal analogues, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Furthermore, because the degree of reprehen-
sibility of the defendant’s conduct is taken into account under 
NJLAD when assessing punitive damages,181 allowing the same crite-
rion to be included in the calculus of emotional distress damages 
permits double compensation for the same wrong.  More impor-
tantly, allowing juries to award compensatory damages for emotional 
distress based upon their assessment of the defendant’s conduct may 
permit unwarranted awards based more on the vindictive and sympa-
thetic passions of the jury than on reason.  In order to keep emo-
tional distress damages for victims of employment discrimination rea-
sonable and fair, plaintiffs should be required to present evidence of 
specific injury before compensation is awarded. 
 
 
 178 Id. at 927. 
 179 Id. at 921. 
 180 See id. at 927–28. 
 181 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West Supp. 2004). 
